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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
occurs; by the same token, the court should have power to com-
pel the trustee to correct an abuse which has already occurred.
It is interesting that the court relies upon the settlor's inten-
tion as its standard, rather than the less subjective "prudent man
rule." In his respect, the decision accords with those in other
jurisdictions.
Huber v. Calcasieu Marine National Bank involved an
action against the trustee for alleged maladministration of an
inter vivos trust. The settlor of that trust died before the action
was brought, leaving her entire estate in two testamentary trusts,
one for the benefit of her only child, a son, and the other for the
benefit of his six children. It was alleged and sustained that the
action against the trustee of the inter vivos trust was an asset
of the estate of the settlor and thus became part of the trust
property of the testamentary trusts. It remained to determine
the proper parties plaintiff. Applying article 2222,7 the court
held that the trustee was the proper party plaintiff and sustained
an exception of no cause or right of action against the remaining
plaintiffs, who were beneficiaries of the testamentary trusts.
The result appears to be correct.
COMMERCIAL PAPER
Ronald L. Hersbergen*
When the signature of the payee of a check is forged, cer-
tain well-settled consequences result: subsequent takers can-
not become holders in due course,1 and the drawee bank pays
6. 262 So.2d 404 (La. App. 8d Cir. 1972).
7. "A trustee is the proper plaintiff to sue to enforce a right of the trust
estate, except that a beneficiary may sue to enforce such a right, in order
to protect his own interest, in an action against:
"(1) A trustee and an obligor, if the trustee improperly refuses, neglects,
or is unable for any reason, to bring an action against the obligor; or
"(2) An obligor, if there is no trustee or the trustee cannot be subjected
to the jurisdiction of the proper court."
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Under R.S. 7:52, a holder in due course is said to be a "holder" who
has taken the instrument under the conditions therein prescribed. R.S.
7:191 defines "holder" as the payee or indorsee who is in possession of the
instrument, or the bearer thereof. But under R.S. 7:30, one becomes a
holder through the negotiation to him, in the case of order paper, by the
indorsement of the prior holder. Thus, the forger, not himself being a
"holder" cannot negotiate the instrument in such a manner that the taker
would be a holder, hence not a holder in due course. The same is true
with respect to subsequent transfers of the instrument bearing the forged
indorsement. See Fidelity Nat. Bank v. Vuci, 224 La. 124, 68 So.2d 781
(1953).
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such an instrument at its peril,2 since the drawer can demand
that his account be re-credited, so long as he acts in a timely
fashion.3 If, however, the drawee bank does pay such an instru-
ment, as to the party receiving the payment, recovery 4 may be
had by the bank, since that payment is not final.5 Thus, the
line of transactions respecting the instrument unfolds in reverse,
each party recovering against his own transferee.6 The payee
is said to have no cause of action against the drawee bank or
collecting banks, but rather his recourse is against the drawer.7
Though circuitous, this approach is well-established in Louisi-
ana.8 The payee is the last "holder" of the instrument and is the
owner of it, having all rights as such.9
Suppose, however, that the drawer executes the check to
copayees A and B, and delivers the check to B, who subsequently
forges A's indorsement and obtains payment from the drawee
bank. Can co-payee A, who has never had possession of the
instrument and thus has never been a "holder""' or transferee of
it, bring an action against the drawer on the instrument? The
2. Couvillion v. Whitney Nat. Bank, 218 La. 1096, 51 So.2d 798 (1951);
Allan Ware Pontiac, Inc. v. First Nat. Bank, 2 So.2d 76 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1941). The drawee bank in such cases will have breached its agreement
with the drawer to pay out of the drawer's deposited funds solely pursuant
to his order or direction. Thus, if on a check payable to "the order of X,"
X's signature is forged, the check no longer is flowing according to "the
order of X," and hence it is no longer the drawer's order.
3. Though R.S. 6:53, which permits only a one year period within which
to bring suit to enforce the liability of a bank which has paid money and
charged to the depositor's account on a forged or raised check has been held
inapplicable to suits against a bank for payment of a check bearing a
forged indorsement, Win. M. Barrett, Inc. v. F4rst Nat. Bank, 191 La. 945,
186 So. 741 (1939), the depositor is under a duty to exercise due diligence to
examine cancelled checks and give immediate notification to the bank upon
discovery of any error therein. See LA. R.S. 6:36 (1950). Furthermore, R.S.
6:35 provides that a statement of account rendered by the bank to the
depositor is deemed finally adjusted and settled and its correctness con-
clusively presumed after a period of five years from the date of its rendition.
Unless the check has been "raised," however, there will be no "error" in
the correctness of the account, and, as noted in the Barrett case, the de-
positor is not usually in a position to spot forged indorsements. In most
cases, the unpaid payee will bring the matter to the drawer's attention.
4. Such a recovery could be based on rescission for mutual mistake of
fact under Civil Code article 2301, or on breach of the vendor warranties.
5. Comment, 16 LA. L. REv. 128 (1955).
6. Thus, the party actually taking from the forger has the burden of
recovering against that wrongdoer.
7. The underlying theory is that the payee has not received payment,
while the drawer can demand a re-crediting of his account.
8. Fidelity Nat. Bank v. Vuci, 224 La. 124, 68 So.2d 781 (1953); M. Feitel
House Wrecking Co. v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 159 La. 752, 106 So. 292(1925); Fernon v. Capital Bank & Trust Co., 190 So.2d 504 (1st Cir. 1966).
9. Fidelity Nat Bank v. Vuci, 224 La. 124, 68 So.2d 781 (1953).
10. LA. R.S. 7:191 (1950).
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Second Court of Appeal faced this issue of apparent first im-
pression in Smith v. Louisiana Bank & Trust Co.." The court
held that a co-payee whose indorsement had been forged may
sue the drawer on the check, despite the fact that he is not and
never was a "holder," since title to the instrument cannot pass
without the valid indorsement of both payees.22 Thus, the non-
indorsing co-payee remains the owner of his "rights" in the
instrument,1 8 and has, in fact, the rights of a holder14 to sue the
drawer on the instrument. The drawer is entitled to recover
as against the drawee, and the transactions on the check again
unfold in reverse.
While the result obtained is perhaps laudable in view of
the relative equities of the parties involved,' 5 the rule announced
does place a strained construction on the concept of holder
status-a status not afforded one who is in possession of an
instrument but who has taken from or through a forger of a
necessary indorsement. The court, however, carefully avoided
sanctioning one viable alternative' 6-the direct action by the
payee against either the drawee bank or a collecting bank' 7-
thus preserving the rule of M. Feitel House Wrecking Co. v.
11. 255 So.2d 816 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971).
12. R.S. 7:41 states that "where an instrument is payable to the order
of two or more payees . . . who are not partners, all must indorse, unless
the one indorsing has authority to indorse for the others." On the issue of
delivery, it is arguable that delivery to one of the co-payees is constructive
delivery to the other. See Vaughn v. Vaughn, 118 So.2d 620 (Miss. 1960).
13. The non-indorsing co-payee was held to be entitled to recover from
the drawer one-half of the amount of the check-his interest as a Joint
payee, the court citing to Baggett v. Rightor, 4 Rob. 18 (La. 1843), and
Barrow v. Norwood, 3 La. 437 (La. 1832).
14. The court, in fact, labeled the plaintiff co-payee as a "holder."
Smith v. Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 255 So.2d 816, 831 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1971).
15. The ultimate loss fell upon the forger.
16. Plaintiff might arguably have a right to recover possession of the
check even though he can assert no prior possession of it. Of. M. Feitel
House Wrecking Co. v. Citizens' Bank & Trust Co., 159 La. 752, 106 So. 292
(1925) (dicta). And, plaintiff obviously could sue on the underlying obliga-
tion. Normally, the only benefit derived from suing on an instrument, as
opposed to suing on the underlying obligation, is the possibility that the
plaintiff may be a holder in due course as to whom personal defenses of
the drawer or maker are not assertable. This benefit, on the other hand,
does not normally flow to the payee anyway, because he is privy to the
transaction from which such defenses arise.
17. Some jurisdictions permit such an action. See Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d
671 (1965).
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Citizens Bank & Trust Co.'5 handed down forty-seven years
ago. Where the drawer seeks a direct recovery 9 from a collec-
ting bank, sound policy reasons may exist which dictate that no
action should lie." If like policy considerations exist 2l where
the payee seeks to recover from the drawee or collecting bank,
the opinion does not express them.
Permitting a payee to whom an instrument was never de-
livered and who is not the holder thereof nor has had at any
time a true possessory interest therein to sue on the instrument
has a curious aspect: such a payee must be assumed to have
legal title to the instrument, for Louisiana jurisprudence has
in the past denied a right of action on the instrument in such
cases in the absence of a showing of holder status or legal
title.22 The advantages that such an approach may have over
allowing a direct action by the payee against the collecting
or drawee bank are imperceptible.2 The majority of jurisdic-
18. 159 La. 752, 106 So. 292 (1925). There the drawer drew a draft payable
to the order of the plaintiff, payable through Canal Bank & Trust Company,
and delivered it to plaintiff's collection agent, who then indorsed plaintiff's
name without authority and deposited the draft for collection to its account
in the defendant bank.
19. As, for example, where the check is stolen prior to delivery to the
named payee, and payment is subsequently obtained via a forged indorse-
ment of the payee's name.
20. The court in Stone 4 Webster Engineer4ng Corp. v. First Nat. Bank
A Trust Co., 345 Mass. 1, 184 N.E.2d 358 (1962), held that such an action did
not lie, since the theoretical appeal of avoiding circuity of action was
overshadowed by the possible avoidance by the drawer of defenses assert-
able by the drawee. One such defense arises by virtue of the drawer's
duty to exercise due care in the examination of his monthly statements and
returned items. To allow the drawer to recover against a collecting bank
would perhaps violate the principle that a depositor has no claim to any
specific assets in his bank, but only a contract right against it. See Note, 386
HARv. L. REv. 879 (1923).
The Stone & Webster view, which is said to be the minority view, was
cited favorably by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal in Gregory-Salisbury
Metal Products, Inc. v. Whitney Nat. Bank, 160 So.2d 813 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1964).
21. The opinion in Stone d Webster left open the question of the payee's
rights against the collecting bank. 184 N.E.2d 858, 863 (1962).
22. Foltier v. Schroder & Schreiber, 19 La. Ann. 17 (1867); Estate, Inc.
v. Southern Land Title Corporation, 230 So.2d 341 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
Cf. Fidelity Nat. Bank v. Vuci, 224 La. 124, 68 So.2d 781 (1954).
23. Part of the theory of requiring the entire transaction to circuitously
reverse itself is that the collecting or "cashing" bank may recover from
the forger by virtue of the indorsement warranties of R.S. 7:66. Smith v.
Louisiana Bank d Trust Co., 255 So.2d 816, 819 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971).
Whether realized by the court or not, this remedy is indeed illusory:
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tions24 do allow the direct action against the bank or person col-
lecting from the drawee, either on a conversion theory or as for
money had and received. In such jurisdictions the fact that the
check in question did not reach the hands of the payee is usually
immaterial.25 Such an approach would be preferable from the
drawer's point of view since he avoids needless litigation, and
if it is assumed that the forger is rarely held accountable, the
loss is usually borne by the "cashing" bank anyway.
The Uniform Fiduciaries Act 26 provides liability as against
a bank with respect to negotiable instruments drawn by a known
fiduciary where the bank takes such an instrument with actual
knowledge that the fiduciary is committing a breach of his
fiduciary obligations in drawing or delivering the instrument
or where the bank is possessed of knowledge of such facts that
taking the instrument amounts to bad faith.27 And, if the fidu-
ciary draws a check upon his principal's account payable to the
drawee bank and delivers it to the bank as payment of or
security for a personal obligation of the fiduciary, the bank will
be liable to the principal, if in fact the fiduciary has by so draw-
ing or delivering the check, committed a breach of his fiduciary
obligations. 28 In Guaranty Bank & Trust Co. v. C & R Develop-
ment Co.,29 the board of directors of a corporation authorized
R.S. 7:66 states that the warranties run to "all subsequent holders in due
course" a status which the court itself admits that the collecting bank
cannot obtain, due to the forged indorsement. Id. at 820. (Emphasis added.)
Thus the only viable theory of recovery for the collecting bank will be that
of recovery of money paid under a mistake of fact under Civil Code art. 2301.
This is the very remedy most jurisdictions give the payee as against the col-
lecting bank. Though the court in the Instant case states that "[i]n the
Vuci case (68 So.2d 781), the cashing bank was allowed to recover against
the forger [of the indorsement] under a breach of warranty, LSA-R.S. 7:65,
7:66 .... " in fact, that case holds that since the collecting bank was not
a holder it could not maintain such an action. Fidetty Nat. Bank v. Vuc4,
224 La. 124, 130, 68 So.2d 781, 783 (1953).
24. It is stated in 10 AM. JUR. 2d Banks, § 632 (1963), at 599-600: "Al-
though there are a few scattered cases to the contrary, the general rule
established by nearly all courts is that a bank . . .which, or an individual
who, has obtained possession of a check upon an unauthorized or forged
indorsement of the payee's signature, and has collected the amount of the
check from the drawee, is liable for the proceeds thereof to the payee . ..."
25. See House-Evans Co. v. Mattoon Transfer & Storage Co., 275 P.2d
268 (Okla. 1954).
26. LA. R.S. 9:3801-14 (1950).
27. LA. R.S. 9:3805 (1950).
28. LA. R.S. 9:3808 (1950).
29. 260 La. 1176, 258 So.2d 543 (1972).
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one Clark, a shareholder, director, and officer of the company,
to sign corporate checks as one of the company's two directors
required to so sign.8 0 Clark, who was personally indebted to
the drawee bank on loans relating to a separate business venture,
allegedly induced the other authorized cosigner to sign six
corporate checks, none of which contained the name of the in-
tended payee, after which Clark inserted the drawee-bank's
name as payee. The proceeds of the checks were then applied to
the payment of Clark's indebtedness to the bank. The bank,
which had mailed monthly statements to the corporation along
with the cancelled checks, apparently was unaware that Clark's
co-signer had signed the checks prior to the insertion of the
bank's name as payee. The Louisiana supreme court held that
the bank was in bad faith within the meaning of R.S. 9:3805 and
3808 when it received the first3l of the six checks, since it was
both the drawee bank and the payee of that check. This fact, said
the court, gave the bank clear evidence of a probable misap-
propriation and gave rise to a duty to inquire as to the validity
of the payment. To the bank's argument that the statute has no
application where there are two fiduciaries, the court observed
that the Statute's definition of "fiduciary" includes "any . .. per-
sons acting in a fiduciary capacity," 2 and that it could not be
said that the co-fiduciary had not violated fiduciary obligations
by signing the checks in blank.
PUBLIC LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION: LAW
AND PROCEDURE
Melvin G. Dakin.*
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
The statute governing the issuance of certificates and per-
mits to motor carriers contains no provision with respect to
30. The corporation originally gave Clark authority to issue checks on
his signature alone. The bank, however, demanded a co-signer.
31. In the absence of prior Supreme Court interpretation of the Uniform
Fiduciaries Act, the court relied upon the decision in Maryland Casualty
Go. v. Bank of Charlotte, 340 F.2d 550 (4th Cir. 1965), which held on similar
facts that the bank was liable on all but the first of a series of checks under
the same provisions of the Act.
32. LA. R.S. 9:3801(2) (1950).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
